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Frank Zimring Responds 
Franklin Zimring† 
  INTRODUCTION   
It was both a pleasure and an honor to participate in the 
2019 Minnesota Law Review symposium, “Mass Incarceration as 
a Chronic Condition: Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Treatment.” The 
symposium offered empirical law-related scholarship to serve as 
a model for academic legal studies. The commentators there 
were an all-star cast of penal policy and imprisonment scholars, 
and their essays here represent both an independent contribu-
tion to the analysis of the causes and cures of mass imprison-
ment and a helpful guide to final revisions on my upcoming book 
concerning the topic, The Insidious Momentum of American 
Mass Incarceration.1  
My aim in this Essay is to put the diversity of papers and 
criticisms presented at the symposium in the context of the over-
all organization and objectives of my study. The first important 
issue to consider is whether I am wasting your time—that is, 
why write yet another book on mass incarceration as an Ameri-
can predicament in 2020? The problem has already been consid-
ered in depth and the need for remedial action is one of very few 
policy issues that is widely acknowledged across the spectrum of 
American political opinion, even in 2020. Why, then, another 
book? 
Because the phenomenal growth of penal confinement in the 
United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century is still 
a public policy mystery with lingering and consequential ques-
tions: Why did it happen when it happened? What explains the 
unprecedented magnitude of prison and jail expansion? Why are 
the current levels of penal confinement so very close to the all-
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time peak rate reached in 2007? What is the likely course of lev-
els of penal confinement in the next generation of American life? 
Are there changes in government or policy that can avoid the 
prospect of mass incarceration as a chronic element of govern-
ance in the United States? 
My study is organized around four major concerns, each of 
which is addressed by the other articles in this issue: (1) What 
happened in the thirty-three years after 1973? (2) Why did these 
extraordinary changes happen in that single generation? (3) 
What is likely to happen to levels of penal confinement in the 
next three decades? And (4) what changes in law or practice 
might reduce this likely penal future? Let me comment on each 
of these topics as discussed at the symposium. 
I.  WHAT HAPPENED FROM 1973 TO 2007? 
Alfred Blumstein has shown that stability in levels of im-
prisonment rather than large variations in penal populations 
was the best description of prison population trends in the 
United States in the half-century from 1925 to 1975, a pattern 
of constancy that became an important contribution to the em-
pirical study of penal policy.2 
This extraordinary continuity was interrupted in the middle 
of the 1970s by what a chapter in my book calls “An American 
Surprise.”3 Figure 1 shows the relative levels of imprisonment of 
the United States and seven other developed nations in 1970.4 
 
 
 2. See Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of 
Punishment, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 204 (1973). 
 3. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 1).  
 4. Id. (manuscript ch. 1 at 6 fig.1.2). 
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Figure 1. Imprisonment Rates per 100,000 of National 
Population, 1970. 
What this graph adds to Professor Blumstein’s analysis is a 
surprising comparative perspective. In 1970, the stable rates of 
imprisonment in the United States were strikingly similar to the 
imprisonment rates of several Western developed nations. When 
American imprisonment rates are measured against nations like 
Italy, Australia, England and Wales, the similarities are much 
more evident than any differences.  
Figure 2 reports imprisonment rates for the same nations in 
2010, and now the position of the United States in the interna-
tional profile is singular.5  
 
Figure 2. Imprisonment Rates per 100,000 of National 
Population, 2010. 
 
 5. Id. (manuscript cht. 1 at 3 fig.1.1). 
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In a single generation, the United States shifted from a 
prison population of 96 per 100,000 to a rate of imprisonment 
five times that magnitude. Examining Figure 2, when one asks 
the question “which nation is in second place?” one plausible an-
swer is “none” because the separation in magnitude between the 
United States and other nations is a difference in kind rather 
than in degree. 
II.  WHY THE GROWTH EXPLOSION? 
The timing of the sudden growth in penal confinement com-
plicates searches for the immediate causes of the penal explo-
sion, and this problem has not been adequately addressed in the 
literature on American mass incarceration. Hyper-incarceration 
is a recent rather than long-term phenomenon in the United 
States. There are a number of long-standing conditions in Amer-
ican government and society that may make the United States 
more vulnerable to penal change and that increase the scale of 
changes when they occur, but the American experiment was two 
centuries old before our institutions were overcome with huge 
increases in the scale of imprisonment. What lit the fuse for this 
relatively recent explosion? What changes in society and govern-
ment match the timetable of the beginning of the penal expan-
sion and were sustained across the thirty-five years of consecu-
tive high magnitude growth? High rates of crime?  
There was growth in crime and violence for a decade in the 
beginning of the mid-1960s that continued until 1974, and then 
the mid-1970s drop was followed by an increase in violent crime 
back to 1974 levels in 1980.6 But then crime dropped again in 
the first half of the 1980s even though the imprisonment rate did 
not.7 And the last fifteen years of huge incarceration growth hap-
pened during the Great American Crime Decline.8 But perhaps 
levels of public fear and anger had a more sustained elevation? 
Here again, public opinion measures of concern are neither sin-
gular nor sustained.9  
One important clue to the immediate causes of the prison 
explosion is the increase in felony convictions and prison admis-
sions linked to the activity of local prosecutors. Crime rates and 
 
 6. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 13 fig.2.3). 
 7. Id. (manuscript ch. 1 at 14 fig.1.4). 
 8. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 6–8 
(2007).  
 9. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 2 at 14 fig.2.4). 
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arrest rates are relatively stable, but prison admissions are sky-
rocketing.10 So the moving parts in the take-off and sustained 
imprisonment growth are in felony prosecution and plea negoti-
ations in the evolving administrative law of crime, as John Pfaff 
suggested in his 2017 study.11 But what changed in prosecution 
and why? Those who choose careers in criminal prosecution have 
strong preferences for punitive sanctions, but this is a chronic 
and relatively stable social fact.12 This was true of prosecutors in 
1965 as well as 1985, which can also be found in other nations, 
as my discussion of Canada shows.13 What happened in the mid-
1970s to change the dynamics of criminal prosecution in the 
United States that substantially increased prison commitments 
here?  
One important change, which tracks the timing of the in-
crease, was the advent of prosecutor management systems to 
provide detailed data on case disposition and penal sanctions 
and to evaluate the outcomes in particular cases.14 Prosecutors 
and the persons who supervise them could swiftly measure a 
prosecutor’s case outcomes and compare them with the case out-
comes of other prosecutors.15 
These systems came into use just as local criminal justice 
had become an administrative process of plea negotiation. 16 
Prosecuting attorneys who rarely participate in criminal trials 
cannot measure their effectiveness as adversaries by their rate 
of conviction.17 Might they instead have started to measure their 
effectiveness by whether the guilty pleas they secured were for 
felonies or misdemeanors, and by the severity of the punishment 
they obtained in this administrative plea bargaining process?  
There are political and governmental aspects of local prose-
cution in the United States that might explain why this phenom-
enon has become much more prevalent in the American system 
than in Canada or Europe. Can we blame the explosive growth 
 
 10. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 24 fig.2.7). 
 11. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERA-
TION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 135–37 (2017). 
 12. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 8). 
 13. Id. at 12–15. 
 14. WHAT’S CHANGING IN PROSECUTION? REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 12–13 
(Philip Heymann & Carol Petrie eds., 2001). 
 15. Id. 
 16. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 3 at 17–19).  
 17. WHAT’S CHANGING IN PROSECUTION? REPORT OF A WORKSHOP, supra 
note 14, at 23–24. 
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of imprisonment in the United States on the appetite of prosecu-
tors for punishments as a measure of their adversarial effective-
ness? 
Two of the commentaries in this symposium discuss this 
part of my book. Professor Weisberg notices my mention of the 
case management impact possibility and my ambivalence about 
attributing too much of the penal explosion to this mundane and 
procedural detail.18 Weisberg wondered in his oral presentation 
whether my mixed feelings might suggest that I am backing off 
this hypothesis. I am not. My ambivalence about this causal the-
ory is, in fact, a reflection of a larger problem: the fabulous con-
trast between the triviality of the independent variable and the 
enormity of its massive impact. If statistical reporting innova-
tions set off the epidemic of imprisonment increases, it would be 
the equivalent of a modest spark igniting a huge destructive for-
est fire. And it is not just this immediate cause of the penal ex-
plosion that seems peculiarly trivial relative to the scale of the 
resulting disaster, but this contrast also applies to any of the 
possible immediate causes of the penal explosion we are likely to 
identify.  
Professor Pfaff reads my account of the parable of the sheep 
farmer and the coyote as seeking to concentrate blame on prose-
cutors exclusively, when my intention was quite the reverse.19 
The point I was trying to make is that we should expect district 
attorneys and their staff to be biased in the direction of penal 
severity and should therefore design systems to compensate for 
this predictable bias, just as sheep farmers should take precau-
tions if there are predatory animals near their farms. For exam-
ple, Canadian prosecutors also prefer more severe punishments 
in surveys, but they evidently do not have the power to carry out 
those preferences.20 The American system should also be de-
signed with safeguards against untrammeled prosecutorial 
power just as the sheep farmers should build fences around their 
flocks rather than just blaming coyotes for their losses. 
 
 18. See Robert Weisberg, Zimring on Mass Incarceration: Empirical Pessi-
mism and Cautious Reformist Optimism, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2695, 2701–05 
(2020). 
 19. See John F. Pfaff, Why the Political Failures of Mass Incarceration Are 
Really Political Failures, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2673, 2687–88 (2020). 
 20. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 8 at 12–15). 
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III.  WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? 
One of the most important sections of my analysis is also the 
most discouraging part of the book—my projection of likely 
trends over the next thirty years. In the almost four decades af-
ter the all-time high point, it is likely that more than half and as 
much as two-thirds of the huge increase will still be in place into 
the middle of the twenty-first century. Why? What might we do 
to avoid this outcome? It is worth noting that not one of the sym-
posium articles takes issue with this analysis. 
The bad news is discussed in my forthcoming book, when the 
first decade of the penal increase is compared to the first decade 
after the 2007 peak rate.21 The characteristics of the first decade 
of growth from 1972 to 1982 were uniform in the fifty-one sepa-
rate penal systems that control the prison population, with large 
levels of change in almost all systems and persistence in trend 
year-to-year.22 In the first post-peak decade from 2007 to 2017, 
however, there has been diversity in outcome among the penal 
systems—small rather than large changes each year—and no 
steady temporal trend. The net effect of this contrast is that the 
decline in imprisonment in the later period was a tiny fraction of 
the 1972 to 1982 growth rate.23 Why is this “business is usual” 
relative stability in mass incarceration the new normal in the 
United States? 
The good news is that there is no deep commitment by our 
citizens or our social structures to a permanent republic of mass 
incarceration. The reality is that what I call the “momentum” of 
persistently high levels of both felony convictions and terms of 
imprisonment is an operational characteristic of the system 
without any deep connections to American social values or secu-
rity needs. The patterns and practices that generate high impris-
onment are superficial in that they do not have important links 
to social values or security needs.  
IV.  STRATEGIES OF REFORM 
The central conclusion of my analysis is that the threat of 
excessive incarceration is not a short-term problem. The same 
organizational characteristics that produced high rates of im-
prisonment are also likely to sustain very high levels of impris-
onment into the middle of the twenty-first century. What can we 
 
 21. Id. (manuscript ch. 5). 
 22. Id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 12–14). 
 23. Id. 
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add to reform efforts that might lessen epic levels of penal con-
finement? And how does the chronicity of mass incarceration 
change the reform agenda that should respond to it? 
The levels of local government that now hold the most power 
in determining the scale of state imprisonment do not pay its 
costs, and the level of state government that pays the cost of im-
prisonment often does not have effective control of rates of im-
prisonment.24 There are two organizational strategies that can 
rationalize this peculiar political economy of imprisonment. The 
first is to create economic incentives or costs for county govern-
ments when they sentence offenders to state prisons.25 The sec-
ond is to make the state’s power to determine prison capacity 
non-responsive to sentences issued by local governments.26 This 
requires state power to release prisoners.27 Rather than choose 
between these strategies, the best approach to reduce over-con-
finement would be to employ both strategies.  
The first step in reforming what Gordon Hawkins and I 
called “the correctional free lunch” would be to either charge 
county governments for all or over-limit prison commitments, or 
to reward county governments for reducing commitment levels.28 
The objective here is to give these local levels of government 
what Raphael and Stoll call “some skin in the game.”29 The basic 
shift in state policy would be a transition from passive to active 
management of prison capacity.30 Since state governments both 
fund and administer prisons, the power to determine the scale of 
each state’s prisons was always at the state level of govern-
ment.31 But state governments typically did not regard their role 
as making policy choices about how much or how little prison 
capacity to plan.32 Instead, Zimring and Hawkins described a 
system that was passive and dedicated to reacting to the custo-
dial demands of local governments: “The correctional planners 
 
 24. This problem has been called the “correctional free lunch.” FRANKLIN 
E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 211–15 (1991).  
 25. Id. at 212. 
 26. Id. at 212–13. 
 27. See id. 
 28. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 7 at 26–27). 
 29. STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS 
IN PRISON? 261 (2013).  
 30. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 24, at 211, 213. 
 31. Id. at 211 (discussing how prisons are paid for at the state level of gov-
ernment out of the state correctional budget). 
 32. Id. at 213 (discussing how state governments are passive about prison 
populations). 
  
2020] ZIMRING RESPONDS  2813 
 
commonly viewed prison population as though it were a natural 
phenomenon like rainfall totally beyond the control of policy 
agencies. ‘We take what the courts send us’ was the response of 
a New England state to a request for information about their 
projection methods . . . .”33 
Yet, this totally passive orientation shifts the power of de-
termining the number of prisoners that must be confined from 
the state government to county governments, which pay none of 
the costs of building and maintaining prisons.34 Once the state 
prison system adopts a strict “we take what the courts send us” 
approach, the local governments who determine prison popula-
tions have no need to regard prison cells as a scarce resource.35 
A forthright use of power that state governments have always 
had can achieve a much more rational political economy of im-
prisonment. 
Expanding the power of state governments to influence both 
commitments and releases from imprisonment carries substan-
tial risks as well as benefits. Professor Frase discusses some of 
those potential problems at the front end of the sentencing pro-
cess,36 and Professor Reitz reminds us of the arbitrary and puni-
tive problematics of parole boards.37 These cautions should be-
come an important element in the careful expansion of state 
power.  
Professor Barkow’s keynote reminded us of how past expan-
sions of penal power require repairs as well as preventive re-
forms.38 The vast expansion of criminal justice and imprison-
ment over the last half-century and the likelihood of continual 
 
 33. Id. at 62. 
 34. Id. at 62, 211–13. 
 35. Id. at 211 (describing how local governments do not contribute to the 
central state correctional budget and the state level of government uses the 
state correctional budget to pay for prisons). 
 36. See Richard S. Frase, Can Sentencing Guidelines Commissions Help 
States Substantially Reduce Mass Incarceration?, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2781, 
2793–97 (2020) (discussing how sentencing guideline commissions have helped 
states limit the use of imprisonment).  
 37. See Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release Reform and American Decarceration, 
104 MINN. L. REV. 2741, 2754–62 (2020) (analyzing different states’ use of 
prison-release discretion).  
 38. Rachel E. Barkow, Vice Dean & Segal Family Professor of Regulatory 
Law & Policy & Faculty Dir., Ctr. on the Admin. of Criminal Law at NYU Sch. 
of Law, Keynote Address at Minnesota Law Review Symposium: Mass Incarcer-
ation as a Chronic Condition: Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Treatment (Nov. 18, 
2019).  
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high rates of prosecution and punishment will leave a substan-
tial human legacy of penal disability and social disadvantage. By 
2010, the number of persons ever imprisoned in the United 
States had already passed seven million, and the number of per-
sons with felony criminal records was in excess of nineteen mil-
lion.39 Both the population of those ever imprisoned and the le-
gion of persons with felony criminal records will increase further 
in the coming years.  
Under these circumstances, the prevention of future excess 
in penal confinement is a necessary but insufficient reform pri-
ority in American criminal justice. The rate of felony convictions 
in the United States expanded fivefold in the same era that the 
prison population increased, but the number of felony convic-
tions is more than twice the size of the number in prison.40 The 
harms generated by disabilities imposed on felons have always 
been problematic, but the bite of penal disability now affects five 
times as many American citizens.41  
Preventing as best we can the continued excess in penal con-
finement is one clear priority for reform. Repairing the damage 
of past excess must be a second imperative.  
 
 
 39. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 10 at 18). 
 40. Id. (manuscript ch. 1 at 17). 
 41. Id. (manuscript ch. 10 at 20). 
